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Why some black hats help companies without being paid

• 13 min •
Person in dark clothing holding a smartphone with code on it and typing on a laptop.

A hacker capable of monetizing a zero-day flaw for several thousand euros sometimes chooses to report it for free to the company concerned. This gesture, seemingly irrational, reveals an underground economy where motivations go far beyond financial gain.

According to Cybersecurity Ventures, black hats are motivated by money, espionage, notoriety and malicious intent. But Malwarebytes adds an essential psychological dimension: money, power and ego. These three levers explain why some hackers switch to helping companies, sometimes without compensation.

This apparent contradiction questions the very foundations of cybercrime and its actors.

This article explores the reasons for this paradoxical behavior, drawing on analyses of the cybercriminal ecosystem and hacker typologies from specialized sources.

Why would a black hat help a company without financial compensation?

The answer comes down to three words: ego, power and challenge. According to Malwarebytes, these motivations are as powerful as the lure of gain. For a hacker, discovering a critical flaw in a system reputed to be inviolable provides intense intellectual satisfaction. Reporting this flaw to the company – even without reward – allows them to obtain public recognition: a security advisory, a credit in a CVE bulletin, or an invitation to a specialized conference. This notoriety can then open doors to legitimate careers, consulting contracts or invitations to private bug bounty programs.

This recognition can sometimes be worth more than immediate payment, because it builds a lasting reputation that attracts legitimate professional opportunities.

> "Black hats are motivated by money, espionage, notoriety and malicious intent." — Cybersecurity Ventures

Power also plays a role: demonstrating that one can compromise a large company, then offering it a hand, places the hacker in a position of symbolic strength. Some see it as a way to "prove" that the company's defenses were insufficient, and to derive a form of prestige within the underground community.

Finally, one should not neglect an ethical dimension, even among actors classified as black hats. Many do not perceive themselves as criminals but as technical whistleblowers. If they discover a vulnerability affecting millions of users, some prefer to report it discreetly rather than sell it to organized criminal groups – a choice that may stem from a remnant of professional conscience or a long-term strategy.

The underground economy: selling a flaw is not always profitable

Contrary to a common belief, the black market for vulnerabilities is neither liquid nor reliable. Selling a flaw on clandestine forums carries major risks: no guarantee of payment, scams between cybercriminals, law enforcement surveillance, and uncertainty about how the exploit will be used. A buyer may very well use the flaw for a massive attack that will attract attention, thereby compromising the seller.

Hooded person typing on a laptop in a dark room

According to the Cyber Defense Review article devoted to organized criminal groups in cyberspace, these organizations operate with hierarchies and trust networks. An independent hacker, outside these circles, will have difficulty monetizing their discoveries at an attractive price. The market is fragmented, prices vary enormously, and some vulnerabilities have only low value if the target is not strategic or if several actors already possess the same flaw.

The Cyber Defense Review emphasizes that these groups often operate in closed networks based on trust and reputation, which makes the entry of an isolated actor difficult and risky.

In this context, reporting a flaw to the company for free can be a rational choice: the hacker avoids legal and criminal risks, while building reusable reputational capital. Moreover, if the vulnerability affects software or a service that they themselves use, they have a direct interest in it being fixed quickly.

Grey hat: the grey area between black hat and white hat

The classification of hackers is not binary. Springer's article on the types of hackers in the aeronautics industry recalls that three profiles are classically distinguished: black hat, white hat and grey hat. Grey hats often break the law – by accessing systems without authorization – but without malicious intent. Their goal is generally to find flaws in order to report them, sometimes in exchange for recognition, sometimes simply for the satisfaction of the challenge.

Person in a hood typing on a laptop in a dark room

This intermediate stance is increasingly common, blurring the traditional benchmarks of security teams.

This profile largely explains the phenomenon of black hats who help for free. In reality, many of these hackers are grey hats: they cross legal lines, but their motivation is not illicit enrichment or destruction. They may break into a system, observe a critical vulnerability, then contact the company with a detailed report, without demanding a reward. Their behavior then corresponds to responsible disclosure, even if the initial access was illegal.

> "Money, power and ego drive hackers toward cybercrime." — Malwarebytes

This grey area is a space of transition: many grey hats eventually become professional white hats, recruited by security companies or integrated into bug bounty programs. Their initial free help often serves as a showcase to demonstrate their skills.

Non-financial motivations: ego, power and reputation

Malwarebytes' analysis highlights three psychological drivers: money, power and ego. If money is the most obvious, ego is probably the most underestimated. For a hacker, succeeding in penetrating a system reputed to be secure provides an adrenaline rush and a feeling of technical superiority. Sharing this success – even without monetary compensation – prolongs this pleasure and transforms it into social status within the community.

Power, for its part, is expressed in the ability to influence a company. By reporting a critical flaw, the hacker forces the company to react, to correct, sometimes to thank him publicly. This inversion of the balance of power is delightful for some, especially when they believe that the company was neglecting its security.

Power is also expressed in the ability to force a company to publicly acknowledge a failure, which can be experienced as a symbolic victory.

Reputation works as a social currency. A hacker whose pseudonym appears in a security advisory or a conference gains credibility. This credibility can then be converted into professional opportunities: pentest assignments, paid conferences, security researcher positions. Thus, helping a company for free can be a long-term strategic investment, far more profitable than a one-off sale on the black market.

Political or ideological motivations also play a role. The Springer report mentions that cybercriminals may act for political, economic or technological reasons. A hacker driven by a cause – protection of privacy, denunciation of corporate practices, cyberwar – may disclose a flaw to force a company to correct a problem he considers dangerous for the public, without expecting a reward.

The risks for companies: not all help is disinterested

When a black hat offers help for free, companies must be extra cautious. The gesture may hide malicious intentions. The hacker may have already exploited the vulnerability, exfiltrated sensitive data, or installed a backdoor before reporting it. They may also use the disclosure as cover for in-depth reconnaissance of the system, or to establish a relationship of trust that they will exploit later.

Before accepting free help, a company must verify the hacker's identity, analyze the technical report, and consult its legal teams to assess the legal implications.

Cyber Defense Review points out that organized criminal groups often use trusted personas and social engineering tactics to infiltrate their targets. A "free" vulnerability report can be the first step in a larger operation: the hacker gains the security team's trust, obtains access to private programs, then exploits that position to carry out an internal attack.

Furthermore, some hackers engage in disguised blackmail: they report a flaw while suggesting that, without quick compensation, they could make it public or sell it to competitors. This practice, bordering on extortion, is difficult to distinguish from sincere responsible disclosure. Companies must therefore establish rigorous verification processes: encrypted communication channels, validation of the hacker's identity, analysis of the report, and legal consultation before any interaction.

Comparison of hacker types and their motivations

The table below highlights the surprising differences between hacker profiles, particularly regarding their propensity to help companies and the associated risks.

| Hacker type | Main motivations | Help to companies | Associated risks |

|----------------|-------------------------|----------------------|------------------|

| Black hat | Money, espionage, notoriety, malicious intent | Rare, often conditional on a reward or a hidden interest | May conceal unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or blackmail |

| Grey hat | Curiosity, technical challenge, ambiguous personal ethics | Frequent, sometimes free, sometimes in exchange for public recognition | Violation of laws, legal risk for the hacker and the company |

| White hat | Security, ethics, often paid via bug bounty | Systematic, within a legal and contractual framework | Low, but may become a target for black hats |

This table reveals a striking contrast: white hats, who help within a legal framework, are generally paid, while grey hats – whose methods are illegal – sometimes help for free. The boundary therefore is not just about money, but about intention and method.

This surprising contrast reveals that money is not the only driver of help to companies. Human psychology, with its needs for recognition and control, plays a role as decisive as financial incentives.

The future of this economy: toward professionalization?

The emergence of bug bounty platforms has considerably changed the landscape. These programs offer official financial rewards for vulnerability disclosure, which reduces the incentive to help for free. Yet non-financial motivations persist. Some hackers still prefer the discretion of direct disclosure, without going through a platform, because it gives them full control over the process and the recognition.

Companies, for their part, are increasingly adopting responsible disclosure policies that welcome reports, even from actors with a troubled past, provided that the rules are respected. This openness blurs the boundary between black hat and white hat even further: a hacker can be considered a criminal one day and a security researcher the next.

The Cyber Defense Review report on organized criminal groups suggests that these organizations are becoming more sophisticated and more professional. For an individual hacker, legitimate work – pentesting, bug bounty, security research – offers an increasingly attractive alternative to the risks of the black market. Free help can therefore be seen as a transitional stage: the hacker tests their value on the legitimate market before fully committing to it.

This strange economy, where actors with murky motivations help companies without compensation, is the symptom of an ecosystem in transition. Human motivations – ego, recognition, challenge, ideology – remain the driving forces, even when money is not forthcoming.

Conclusion

Black hats do not always act according to purely financial logic. Ego, power, notoriety, personal convictions and long-term strategic calculations explain why some choose to help companies for free. This reality forces us to rethink the Manichaean view of hacking: the boundary between criminal and benefactor is often blurred.

Companies that understand these dynamics can transform a risky interaction into a mutually beneficial security partnership.

For companies, understanding these motivations is essential. It makes it possible to design more effective disclosure programs, to better assess the sincerity of reports, and to transform a risky interaction into an opportunity to strengthen their security. The cybercrime economy is not just a matter of money; it is also a matter of humans.

The next questions to explore could concern the real effectiveness of bug bounty programs, the legal aspects of disclosure by grey hats, or the strategies used by government agencies to recruit hackers.

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